Enforcibility of Arbitration Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements by Gillis, Catherine E.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 37 | Issue 2 Article 10
1949
Enforcibility of Arbitration Clauses in Collective
Bargaining Agreements
Catherine E. Gillis
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law
Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gillis, Catherine E. (1949) "Enforcibility of Arbitration Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 37 :
Iss. 2 , Article 10.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol37/iss2/10
ENFORCIBILITY OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
The case of Gatliff Coal Company v. Cox,' decided by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the- 6th Circuit in 1944, is the only case found
in which an interpretation of Kentucky decisions is applied to an
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement. The reasons
given therein for holding such clauses unenforcible are typical of
those used by the majority of courts in the United States in their
holdings that an agreement in a contract to submit to arbitration any
dispute arising thereunder is invalid. For convenience, therefore, the
soundness of the Cox decision is questioned in particular, in the be-
lief that this discussion will apply to any similar future holding.
The Cox case was an action brought by an employee against a
coal company to collect back wages alleged to be due under a wage
scale set up in a collective bargaining agreement between the South-
ern Appalachian Coal Operators' Association and United Mine Work-
ers of America, District 19. The coal company wds a member of the
Association and had signed the agreement. Cox was a member of the
Union. The company contended that the wage scale governing Cox's
rate of pay was the scale set up in a collateral agreement between
the coal company and the Union, which agreement had been ratified
by the Association.
The wage agreement relied upon by the plaintiff contained the
standard arbitration clause found in all United Mine Workers' con-
tracts. This clause provides that any differences arising between
workers and the operator as to the meaning and application of the
contract and as to differences not specifically mentioned therein
shall be settled in the following manner: First, between the ag-
grieved party and the mine management. Second, if they cannot
agree, between the mine management and the Mine Committee
(made up of union members employed by the company). Third, if
an agreement still has not been reached, by a Board consisting of
two members appointed by the Mine Workers and two members ap-
pointed by the Operators, plus an umpire designated jointly by the
International President of the United Mine Workers of America and
the President of the Operators' Association. A decision reached at
any stage is final and binding on both parties.
After removal of the action to the federal court, the defendant
coal company in its answer alleged that compliance with the fore-
going provisions of the contract sued on was a condition precedent
to the bringing of the action, and moved for a stay of trial and all
proceedings in the action until arbitration could be had. This motion
142 F 2d 876 (C.C.A. 6th, 1944).
'Latter v Holsum Bread Company, 108 Utah 364, 160 P 2d 421
(1945)
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was made under Section 3 of the National Arbitration Act, which
provides:
"If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the
courts of the United States upon any issue referable to
arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, .the court in which such suit is pending,
upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such
suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such
an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties
stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment, provided the applicant for the stay is not in de-
fault in proceeding with such arbitration."
The District Court overruled the motion for a stay and the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed its judgment upon the following
grounds:
(1) In Kentucky an agreement between the par-
ties to a contract to arbitrate all of the disputes arising
in the future thereunder is invalid and unenforcible as
constituting an attempt to oust the courts of their juris-
diction;
(2) The National Arbitration Act does not apply
to collective bargaining agreements concerning em-
ployees engaged in interstate commerce.
In making ruling (1) above, the court said:
"It may be that the courts in refusing to specifically
enforce arbitration agreements because against public
policy have placed too great faith in the courts alone
and that no unrighteous purpose would be served by
upholding such contracts because their enforcement
would often determine disputes and controversies, thus
avoiding the formalities, the delay and expense and the
vexation of ordinary litigation. The rule prevails in
Kentucky that parties may not by contract deprive
themselves of the right to resort to courts for the settle-
ment of their controversies. It is our duty to expound,
not make the law of the state."'
To support its statement of the law, the court cited four Ken-
tucky cases, none of which dealt with collective bargaining agree-
ments," but overlooked a definite statement of legislative policy as
to arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements.
In Article III of Chapter 105 of Acts of the General Assembly
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky (1940), the Legislature said
(page 427)
43 STAT. 883 (1925) 9 U. S. C. sec. 3 (1940)
142 F 2d 876, 881 (C.C.A. 6th, 1944).
Jones v. Jones, 229 Ky 71, 16 S.W 2d 503 (1929) Continental
Insurance Company v. Vallandingham and Gentry, 116 Ky. 287, 76
S.W 22 (1903), Ison v Wright, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1368, 55 S.W 202
(1900), Gaither v. Dougherty, 18 Ky L. Rep. 709, 38 S.W 2 (1896).
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"A sound, constructive and progressive develop-
ment of the natural resources of this state and of in-
dustrial development and expansion promotes the gen-
eral welfare and increases the opportunities of employ-
ment. and improves the standards of living; and the
welfare, success, and promotion of the best interests of
both industry and labor are largely dependent upon
reasonable, fair and equitable treatment of both em-
ployers and employees. Peaceful and amicable concilia-
tion, mediation and arbitration of disputes between em-
ployees should be, and is hereby declared to be the pub-
lic policy of this Commonwealth, "I (Italics writer's.)
This public policy is further revealed and emphasized by two
Kentucky statutes enacted in th; same chapter and under the above
statement of public policy
Kentucky Revised Statutes, sec. 336.140, provides that the Com-
missioner of Industrial Relations may inquire into and mediate labor
disputes within the Commonwealth. But it also provides:
"Where a joint wage agreement, existing between
an employer and any labor organization, provides for
the settlement of disputes, any disputes that arise shall
be settled by the terms of the contract, and when so
settled shall be binding and final upon the commis-
sioner."
Kentucky Revsed Statutes, sec. 336.150, sets up the mediation
machinery of the Department of Industrial Relations and gives the
Commissioner the power to offer this service if any emergency by
reason of a labor dispute is found to exist at any time. This section,
however, further provides:
"(3) Nothing in this section shall apply where a
joint wage agreement provides for settlement of dis-
putes. Any dispute arising under such agreement shall
be settled according to it."
In view of this positive declaration of public policy, it is diffi-
cult to see how it can be said that it is against public policy to en-
force such arbitration clauses.
For many years lower federal courts in cases involving contracts
other than collective wage agreements sought to overcome the fol-
lowing dictum from Home Insurance Company of New York v.
Morse:
"They [referring to cases cited] show that agree-
ments in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction
conferred by law are illegal and void."
7
In 1925, Congress passed the National Arbitration Act2 which it
described as:
'This important part of the statute was omitted in the 1942 re-
vision of the statutes, with the apparently erroneous statement that it
establishes no rights or duties. Notes and Annotations to the Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes, p. 1108 (1944).
120 Wall. 445, 451 (U.S. 1874).843 STAT. 883 (1925) 9 U.S.C. sec. 1, et seq. (1940).
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"An Act to make valid and enforceable written
provisions or agreements for arbitration of disputes
arising out of contracts, maritime transactions, or com-
merce among the states or territories or with foreign
nations."'
Sec. 2 of this Act makes such provisions valid, irrevocable and
enforcible and sec. 3 directs that upon motion of the proper party,
the court will stay proceedings until arbitration can be had, if the
contract containing the clause is valid in itself and if the issue is one
which is referable to arbitration under the contract.
Section 1, however, provides:
94 but nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railway employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or in-
terstate commerce."' 0
The Circuit Court of Appeals in the Cox case held that the above
provision removed from the operation of the Act a collective bargain-
ing agreement between coal miners and their employer.
It-is believed that the court in making this ruling overlooked the
fact that in 1925'-when this act was passed, the concept of interstate
commerce was very narrow, and for a worker to be engaged in in-
terstate commerce, it was considered that his work must be in the
actual stream of commerce. At that time, a decision of the Supreme
Court held that the mining of coal was not interstate commerce'
And, before the Arbitration Act was passed, Congress had made
provision for the settlement by arbitration of disputes involving sea-
men
1
2 and railway employees."
The more reasonable interpretation of sec. 1 would seem to be
that Congress approved of arbitration of disputes between employ-
ers and employees engaged in interstate commerce, but believed that
it had already adequately provided therefor by other laws. The
words "any other class of workers engaged in interstate com-
merce" were probably meant to apply to employees such as bus and
truck drivers who were engaged in the stream of commerce but were
not railway employees.
The only other reasonable theory for the exclusion of such con-
tracts from the operation of the Act is that Congress feared enforce-
ment thereof might allow personal servitude. This story disappears
upon examination. It has been the labor unions who have insisted
upon the settlement of disputes by mediation and arbitration from
the earliest years of their existence. The clauses are put in the con-
tracts at their instance and the workers themselves are very jealous
of all of their rights thereunder. In fact, one of the most common
'Feb. 12, 1925, c. 213, 43 STAT. 883 (1925)1043 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U.S.C. sec. 1 (1940)
1 Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. v. Yurkonis, 238 U.S.
439 (1915).
1217 STAT. 267 (1872).
"338 STAT. 103 (1913)
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arguments against making a contract with a umon was that the em-
ployees expended more time in taking their grievances to the com-
mittee than they spent in productive work.
It is also true that a collective bargaining agreement is not a true
contract or employment. It is an agreement made between an em-
ployer, or a group of employers, and a union. The contract defines
wages, working conditions and other terms of employment. It is, as
to an individual employee, merely a continuing offer," and is bind-
ing on him only when, and for as long as, he chooses to work for the
contracting employer. rie may then sue upon the contract." But, the
employer coulc never, through specific performance or any other
means, force any individual union member, against his will, to ac-
cept or continue employment. Only the bargaining agent signs the
contract, never the employee, and there is nothing in the contract
which could possibly be held to bind any individual to accept its
terms except tor the period during which he voluntarily accepts the
employment.
As the court in the Cox case made a flat holding that the Na-
tional Arbitration Act did not apply to the contract in question, it
omitted any discussion of public policy as expressed by Congress on
this subject. bince that decision was handed down, however, Con-
gress has declared that:
"Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the
parties is the desirable method for settlement of griev-
ance disputes arising over the apphcation or interpre-
tation or an existing collective bargaining agreement."'m
The union would doubtless enforce the arbitration clause by
strike ir the employer at any time refused to comply with it. And,
since public policy on this subject has been so clearly stated and the
desirability of the narrow interpretation of "interstate commerce"
as used in the National Arbitration Act is so apparent, it is not im-
possible to believe that the court would have seized upon these
grounds to grant the stay of proceedings if the employee had asked
for it.
The situation today in Kentucky is this: A union and an em-
ployer or association of employers, competent parties, contract at
arm's length. Negotiations are often bitter and may cover a period
of weeks or months. An arbitration clause, beneficial to both parties,
is inserted in the contract and both parties, in most instances, com-
ply faithfully with it. In fact, the decision in the Cox case has been
totally ignored by the parties to such contracts and the Arbitration
Board set up under the contract has become a semi-permanent,
quasi-court, settling many disputes at its regular meetings. If the
employer chose to disregard the clause and refused to arbitrate any
'" Gatliff Coal Company v. Cox, 142 F 2d 876 (C.C.A. 6th, 1944).
' Ibid.
61 STAT. 120, 29 U.S.C.A. sec. 173d (Supp. 1947).
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dispute arising between it and an employee, work would stop and
federal and state authorities would step in and insist that it comply
with the contract. But, under the present state of the law, although
the individual employee, as a third party beneficiary, can enforce
any of the terms of the contract against the employer, he may if he
desires, totally ignore the arbitration clause and the courts, both
federal and state, will uphold his inequitable conduct.
The sound public policy of the Commonwealth, as announced
by the legislature, demands "reasonable, fair and equitable treat-
ment" of the employer as well as of the employee. Since the treat-
ment of the employer under the Cox decision is neither reasonable,
fair nor equitable, public policy would seem to require, if the ques-
tion ever reaches the courts again, a decision that arbitration clauses
in collective bargaining agreements are valid and binding equally
upon employer and employee; that specific performance thereof will
be granted; and that in any action upon such a collective bargaining
agreement, a stay will be granted upon proper motion, if the issue
involved is one which is referable to arbitration under the contract.
Such a decision can easily be reached in the federal courts under the
National Arbitration Act. And, in view of the clear statement of the
Kentucky legislature, it should be possible to reach such a result in
the state courts, even in the absence of a statute.
CATHERINE E. GILLIS
